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ABSTRACT
Dell's mass-customization manufacturing model, which allows the company to offer
cost-effective, individually configured computer systems, has been a key source of
competitive advantage. The expansion in the catalog of customer options, however, has
led to increased supply chain costs. A three-part approach is presented for limiting these
costs without adversely affecting the customer's experience.
The most important task is to quantify the total cost of the decision to add or retain a
single part. The resulting model reflects the impact on the entire supply chain of
maintaining a part, incorporating costs that are embedded in a variety of cost centers at
the manufacturer and its suppliers. While it is impossible to precisely quantify this cost,
the model provides sufficient accuracy to serve as a useful decision tool.
The second step is to apply the model to a sample of real parts. This helps to establish
procedures for selecting parts that should be removed, overcoming problems such as the
allocation of cost and revenue. The second objective of the case study is to establish the
potential savings from addressing the part-proliferation problem.
Finally, the cost model and procedures of the first two stages are used as inputs to a set of
management procedures thatidentify and discontinue unnecessary parts. These
procedures take into account not only financial considerations, but also qualitative
concerns such as strategic planning. This process ensures that the parts catalog is
systematically managed to maintain the optimal offering of customer options.
Thesis Supervisors:
Kamal Youcef-Toumi, Professor of Mechanical Engineering
Roy E. Welsch, Professor of Statistics and Management, Director CCREMS
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DEFINITIONS
BOM
CAPM
Core Team
CoC
DAO
DSI
Hub
Part
Part Number
Bill of Materials
Capital Asset Pricing Model
Team incorporating all functions involved in a product's life cycle, e.g.
engineering, marketing, and manufacturing. Responsible for all product
decisions in the PRP. See Section 4.1.
Center of Competence. Organization with various roles, the most
important in this context being the definition of pricing. See Section 2.1.
Dell Americas Operations. The scope of the project is limited to Dell's
manufacturing operations in the US and Brazil.
Days' Sales in Inventory. A measure of inventory levels in terms of the
average daily sales of the part. This inventory is stored in the hub.
A warehouse, operated by a third-party contractor, used to store safety
stock. Inventory in the hub is kept on suppliers' books until it passes the
factory loading dock a few hours before assembly. Also called "SLC."
See section 2.1.2.
See "Part number."
Also called "part." Can be a subassembly consisting of individual,
lower-level part numbers. Because these subassemblies are not stored
separately, they do not incur significant cost. Part number in this thesis
therefore denotes the lowest level in the BOM tree, i.e. a purchased part.
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Peripheral
PG
PRP
SCM
SLC
SKU
WACC
WWP
Any component or accessory of a base system for which a customer is
offered a choice of options. Examples include hard drives, memory, and
monitors.
Product Group. Organization primarily responsible for product
development and marketing. See Section 2.1
Phase Review Process. Set of procedures and guidelines developed by
Dell to manage all products throughout their life cycles. The PRP is
based on the concept of the core team, in which members from all
important functions, e.g. engineering, marketing, and procurement, are
jointly responsible for all decisions concerning their product. See
Section 4.1.
Supply Chain Management (See Section 2.1)
Supplier Logistics Center. See "Hub."
Stock Keeping Unit. Items sold to customers, which break down into
part numbers in the BOM.
Working Average Cost of Capital. In this thesis, used to determine the
holding cost of inventory.
Worldwide Procurement. Organization responsible for strategic supply
chain planning and for the negotiation of supplier contracts. See section
2.1.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
The purpose of this background section is to provide a context in which to place the
problems addressed by this thesis, rather than presenting a comprehensive survey or
history of manufacturing. A brief history of Dell is followed by a description of how
Dell's strategy of mass customization fits within a broader manufacturing and supply
chain framework, and the issues that arise from this strategy.
1.1.1 Company History
Since its modest beginnings in 1984 in Michael Dell's dormitory room at the University
of Texas, Dell has growrinto a leading computer manufacturer, with a global presence
and annual sales in excess of $33 billion. This astonishing success was based on Dell's
Direct Model, which enabled it to deliver cost-effective PCs manufactured to each
customer's individual requirements. While other manufacturers also implemented similar
models, they were unable to match Dell's efficiency and the resulting market dominance.
1.1.2 Dell's Manufacturing Model
For most of the 20th century, the mass production of standardized products was the
dominant manufacturing model The Ford Model T, which was available in any color as
long as it was black, epitomizes the extreme of this type of manufacturing system. At the
opposite end lies pure customization, in which every order is designed and built
specifically to the individual customer's requirements. Examples of this approach
include traditional crafts industries like jewelry, as well as large-scale construction
13
projects. Most industries lie somewhere along the continuum between these two
extremes; Lampel and Mintzberg divide this continuum into the five stages shown on
Figure 1:'
Pure Segmented Customized Tailored Pure
Standardization Standardization Standardization Customization Customization
PC Industry
Figure 1: Continuum of manufacturing strategies
Traditionally, PC manufacturers have followed the segmented-standardization strategy,
building systems to stock in large volumes for general customer segments, and selling the
systems through wholesalers and distributors; any customization is accomplished through
rework, either by distributors or at the point of sale. This results not only in the quality
problems and added costs inherent in reworking products, but also in significant losses
from a large, rapidly depreciating inventory (a general rule of thumb is that PC inventory
depreciates by 1% per week).
Dell's model, on the other hand, is based on customized standardization, in which
systems are individually tailored to each customer's requirements during final assembly.
This type of strategy is more generally known as masscustomi zation. While it is often
promoted as a panacea for any manufacturing company, mass customization can only be
Joseph Lampel and Henry Mintzberg, "Customizing Customization," MIT Sloan Management Review,
Fall 1996, 21-30.
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effective in those industries that satisfy the three primary requirements defined by Zipkin2
- elicitation, logistics, and process flexibility - and can integrate these elements with a
reliable communication flow. As described in the following sections, Dell has
successfully implemented strategies that fulfill these requirements, leading to its current
domination of the computer industry.
1.1.2.1 Elicitation
Dell's strategy of dealing directly with customers gives it an advantage in satisfying the
first requirement for mass customization: elicitation, or a system of obtaining
information from customers about their requirements for each order. The Direct Model
provides Dell first-hand knowledge about customer needs, avoiding the
misinterpretations and delays that can occur when this information has to travel through
an indirect distribution channel. By controlling the customer's selection process,
primarily on the website but also through telephone sales, Dell is able to determine
exactly how the order should be configured, as well as coaxing the customer toward
Dell's preferred alternative, avoiding the selection of scarce components. In addition to
providing information about the customer's individual configuration, this direct
relationship allows Dell to gauge the overall market, adjusting its product offering and
pricing points in response to competitive conditions.
2 Paul Zipkin, "The Limits of Mass Customization," MIT Sloan Management Review, Spring 2001, 82.
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1.1.2.2 Logistics
The second necessary capability is logistics: the transportation and tracking of products
through the entire value chain, from supplier to customer. In Dell's case, this process
includes three main stages:
" The shipment of inbound material by third-party logistics providers,
primarily through bulk airfreight, ocean cargo, and trucks.
" The movement and tracking of bar-coded components within the assembly
line.
* Shipment directly to customers through package-shipment companies like
FedEx and United Parcel Service (UPS).
Because these logistics solutions are available to any company, they do not constitute a
competitive advantage for Dell.3 They do, however, constitute a necessary, though not
sufficient, component of a mass-customization manufacturing model.
1.1.2.3 Process Flexibility
The third main requirement for mass customization is a manufacturing process with the
flexibility to individually configure each system in a cost-effective manner. While
improvements in design modularity, information technology, and fabrication methods
have been important contributors to Dell's leadership in process flexibility, the real key
has been the selection and implementation of its supply chain strategy, which is a hybrid
3 While logistics do not provide a conclusive competitive advantage, Dell's efforts to make its logistics
processes more efficient have resulted in significant cost savings, providing an incremental contribution to
Dell's ability to compete on price.
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between the two types of inventory and material-flow systems: push and pull. By
definition, this system only affects inbound inventory, as the build to-order model
implies that there is no outbound inventory.
Push
In a push system, materials are produced and procured in anticipation of forecast demand,
and are held in inventory until they are used in final assembly. These systems rely on
two main inputs: the bill of materials (BOM) to explode anticipated demand for the end
product into forecasts for individual components, and the forecast, also called the master
production schedule. The most important of the five basic properties of forecasts defined
by Nahmias is that they are always wrong.4 As a result of this unavoidable inaccuracy,
the only way to ensure adequate availability of the manufacturer's end product is to
maintain extensive safety stocks, tying up working capital and incurring storage charges.
Push systems have historically been more prevalent than pull systems, and define the
strategies of some of Dell's competitors. While this ensures a high level of material
availability, it also results in high costs; these costs are particularly pronounced in the
case of rapidly depreciating components likethose used in computers. The upstream
stages of Dell's supply chain are also push systems, as the long lead times inherent in the
processing of many of these inputs, such as semiconductors, require the maintenance of
extensive inventories. At a point further downstream, the supply chain becomes a pull
system as Dell draws down the inventory in response to customer orders.
4 Steven Nabmias, Production and Operations Analysis, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2001),
57.
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Pull
In a pull system, on the other hand, materials are manufactured and procured only in
response to actual orders. One category of pull system is a Just in Time (JIT) scheme, in
which inventory is kept to a minimum (or is nonexistent) and the only material present is
that needed for systems currently in process. Although the term "lean manufacturing" is
often used interchangeably with "JIT", it should be properly viewed as a superset of JIT;
Womack and Jones classify pull as the fourth of the five principles of lean thinking that
lead to higher productivity through the elimination of waste:5
1. Specify Value in terms of actual customer needs.
2. Identify the Value Stream, from raw material to end customer.
3. Organize the processflow to match the value-creating activities for each product.
4. Pull product through the system only as customers need it.
5. Continuously improve processes to achieve perfection.
As mentioned in the preceding section, Dell's supply chain is a hybrid between a push
and a pull system. The point at which this transition from push to pull takes place is not
entirely clear, as it depends on Dell's level of commitment to buy the inventory (see
Section 2.1.2), but, because the transition is upstream of Dell, the company generally
considers its supply chain to be a pull system. It is important to keep in mind, though,
that the requirements of Dell's environment and business model actually call for a hybrid
James P. Womack and Daniel T. Jones, Lean Thinking: Banish Waste and Create Wealth in Your
Corporation (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 9-28.
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system. The first factor precluding a pure pull system is the combination of
unpredictability in Dell's demand with extremely long manufacturing lead times for some
components. While Dell partially reconciles this discrepancy by influencing demand
through pricing incentives, some safety stocks will always be needed somewhere in the
system. Additionally, JIT requires very close relationships with a small number of
suppliers, based on open communications and a high degree of trust;6 this type of
approach is generally not conducive to multiple sourcing. Dell, on the other hand, uses
multiple sourcing to obtain price reductions, and has somewhat adversarial relationships
with many suppliers. Finally, JIT generally requires geographic proximity with suppliers
in order to limit transit times. In Dell's case, though, the trend is to increasingly seek
lower-priced Asian components, resulting in large in-transit inventories.
Given its market and operational constraints, Dell has selected a hybrid push-pull
inventory system that allows it to fulfill the third requirement of mass customization:
process flexibility.
1.1.2.4 Communications
Finally, the three main requirements of mass customization (elicitation, logistics, and
process flexibility) must be integrated into an effective system. Because accurate
delivery of each uniquely configured system involves multiple functional organizations,
such as sales, engineering, manufacturing, and logistics, continuous communications
across the organization are necessary. Dell's matrix organization, with its extensive
6 Nahmias, 392.
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network of cross-functional links, ensures that these communications take place,
effectively binding the three main components of a mass-customization model.
This mass-customization model has allowed Dell to tailor each system to the individual
customer's requirements while remaining cost competitive, leading to its current
dominance of the PC market. Whilegenerally highly successful, this approach has led to
the problem described in the following section.
1.2 MOTIVATION
Figure 2 illustrates the problem addressed by this thesis. The key to Dell's continued
growth in market share and profitability has been its build-to-order model, which allows
it to offer cost-effective systems built to each customer's precise requirements. As the
personal computer market has matured, customers have grown increasingly sophisticated,
and have therefore demanded a growing array of options when customizing their systems;
these options are in turn supported by a growing inventory of distinct part numbers. This
proliferation of parts has led to higher part-management costs, such as purchasing
headcount, inventory storage, and logistical expense.
20
Profitability
Build-to-Order
Model
Customer
Flexibility / Customization
Options Catalog
GrowingInventory of Distinct Parts Cost
Figure 2: Part-proliferation problem
In addition to the long-term growth in the active-part count, there has been a tendency for
parts to remain in the catalog even after demand had dropped below levels that would
justify their existence. These parts slowly accumulated until somebody decided to
initiate a part-cleanup effort, at which point the part count would suddenly drop, only to
start slowly growing again. Figure 3 shows the resulting saw-toothed shape of the part
count.
0U
Part cleanu
-- Long-term trend
Time
Figure 3: Part-proliferation trend
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It is worth noting that no data on the extent of this problem were available; even
determining the historical part count proved to be difficult, and in the end not worth the
effort. It was therefore taken as a given, in developing this thesis, that part proliferation
was a serious problem. The real severity of the problem is actually of secondary
importance; more important is the fact that it was perceived to be a problem at Dell, and
significant resources were being devoted to addressing various aspects of part
proliferation. Therefore, simply having a systematic process in place to avoid needless
proliferation would be of value, as it would prevent the waste of resources on inefficient
ad hoc efforts.
1.3 THESIS OBJECTIVES
This thesis describes a method of striking a balance between controlling the cost of part
management by limiting unnecessary and unprofitable options, and offering sufficient
options to maintain a positive customer experience and ensure continued sales growth for
Dell. While the costs of part management should certainly be limited where possible, it
is essential not to erode a source of Dell's competitive advantage in the process.
1.3.1 Alternative Approaches
The open-ended nature of the initial project mandate necessitated a lengthy discovery
phase before arriving at the most appropriate approach for solving the problem. Of the
numerous other ideas that were considered and not selected, the two most important are
presented in this section, with two objectives: to demonstrate the constraints thatled to
the selection of the solution proposed in this thesis, and to provide information that might
be of use in addressing the part-proliferation problem under different conditions.
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A generalized solution might have followed the recommendations given by Child et a17 to
optimize market variety. This approach, shown on Figure 4, calls for a comprehensive
review of the product offering. While this framework, if implemented, would certainly
lead to improvements in the product offering, it was not selected because it reflects, to a
certain degree, decisions that were already being made in other contexts at Dell.
Moreover, its broad scope made its implementation unrealistic, both because of the
limited duration of this project and the political issues associated with completely
overhauling the product offering.
7 Peter Child, Raimund Diederichs, Falk-Hayo Sanders, and Stefan Wisniowski, "SMR Forum: The
Management of Complexity," MIT Sloan Management Review, Fall 1991, 74-75.
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Understand the Fundamental Requirements of All
Downstream Customers
* Brainstorm.
" Review research materials.
* Interview internal and external experts.
* Arrange workshops with customers,
suppliers.
Estimate Existing Product Cannibalization and Potential
Competitive Substitution
" Identify substitutes.
* Derive the substitution rate.
" Model or real-life test the impact of
substitution given various market product
range decisions.
Redesign Product Range to Optimize Market Variety
" Cut the existing product range.
* Fundamentally reconfigure the product
range into new bundles of attributes.
Figure 4: Generalized approach to optimizing market variety
Another solution would have been to make the management of every single part more
efficient, rather than changing the part count. While this would be desirable, the high
stakes involved - the Dell Americas procurement organization buys over $10 billion a
year in parts - would make far-reaching changes to Dell's supply chain strategy highly
risky, and unlikely to happen during the short duration of this project.
1.3.2 Thesis Approach
After considering the preceding alternatives, the selected approach was to develop a set
of management procedures to systematically review all customer options (also called
peripherals) both before their introduction and periodically during their production life,
and eliminate those that are deemed unnecessary. The decision would take place at a
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meeting, in which both quantitative and qualitative concerns are taken into account; these
concerns include customer experience, long-term strategic market placement, and the
financial benefit of introducing or keeping the part. Because the financial benefit is the
only one of these inputs that was not already available in some form, the focus of this
thesis is the development of a methodology for performing a cost/benefit analysis of each
part. The cost is found by quantifying all of the indirect, hidden costs that are incurred in
introducing a new part, incorporating the results into a comprehensive model. The
benefit is found by assigning a share of the revenue from the high-level assemblies that
customers buy to each individual part number.
It would be valuable to validate the proposed approach after its implementation in order
to ensure that it really does solve the problem. Unfortunately, the nature of the part-
proliferation problem precludes any conclusive validation. It would be possible to track
the part count after the implementation of the part-management process, but this would
rely on some arbitrary reduction target that did not represent any real measure of success.
Even if such a target were selected with confidence, the other forces driving the part
count, such as consumer demands or supplier-selection considerations, would confound
any gains from this management process. It would also be unrealistic to directly measure
financial savings, as the cost of managing each part varies over time, for example as
purchasing procedures become more efficient or inventory is trimmed, again confounding
any gains from the management process presented here.
Given these limitations to stipulating a verifiable set of criteria for success, it is more
relevant to use more subjective, open-ended criteria. This process provides a forum that
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forces the review of part numbers, ensuring that no parts are forgotten and continue
incurring costs long after their useful lives. By forcing the organization to actively
consider each part, the procedures ensure that at least the most inappropriate parts will be
eliminated. Moreover, the cost model provides visibility into the cost of managing a part,
ensuring better-informed decisions in the future. Even in the unlikely event that it did not
result in the elimination of parts, it would ensure that the indirect costs of the decision to
add or retain a part were considered in a rational, systematic manner. Finally, the
comprehensive approach taken in this thesis will ensure that fewer resources are wasted
on ad hoc efforts to eliminate part numbers. The benefits, though unquantifiable, will
therefore be twofold: a reduction in part numbers and the associated costs of managing
them, and the preemption of wasteful localized efforts to address the problem.
1.4 THESIS DELIVERABLES
Due to the limited duration of this project, it was not feasible to fully implement all of the
recommendations of this thesis. It was agreed ahead of time that the deliverables would
consist of a set of recommendations to Dell management, along with a reasonable
business case for implementing those recommendations. Additionally, a model of the
costs of managing a part number was to be completed and delivered.
1.5 THESIS OVERVIEW
This document will begin with the presentation, in Section 2, of a model that
comprehensively quantifies the incremental costs that are incurred upon the addition, or
retention, of a single part number. The cost model is the focus of this thesis for two
reasons: it took the bulk of project time, and it is the only phase that was expected to be
26
completed during the project timeframe. Because an understanding of the process of
managing a part is a prerequisite to understanding the associated costs Section 2 begins
with an overview of this process, and continues with a description of the cost model.
Section 3 presents the results of a case study that served two purposes: to establish a
suitable method of allocating revenue and cost to each part, and to establish the business
case for implementing a management process to limit the proliferation of parts. Section 4
describes this management process, which uses the cost model of Section 2 and the
revenue-allocation methods of Section 3 as inputs. Finally, this thesis concludes with a
brief summary and the recommendations of Section 5.
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2 COST MODEL
The first and most time-consuming phase of the project was to find the cost to Dell of
managing a single part number, i.e. the incremental lifetime cost to the company of
adding one part number (or, conversely, the savings resulting from the removal of one
part number). This phase was divided into six tasks, each of which is described in its
own subsection:
1. Map the supply chain process to understand where costs are incurred
2. Evaluate the model's ultimate application, to judge the required accuracy
3. Make the necessary simplifying assumptions
4. Quantify all the cost drivers
5. Consolidate the most important cost drivers into a single model
6. Certify the model as Dell's official cost of managing a part
Because the results are based on a series of assumptions, it is unrealistic to provide a
single value for the cost. Therefore, the model outputs a range of values that incorporates
the propagation of all best-case and worst-case assumptions, providing a more realistic
estimate of the cost.
2.1 SUPPLY CHAIN PROCESS
The first step in developing a cost model is to understand the wrk performed in creating
and managing a part, and the organizations that are affected by that work. A new part
incurs cost through the four processes shown on Figure 5: part-number creation,
planning, manufacturing, and service. Note that the figure is a simplification: given
28
Dell's highly-networked structure, there are actually countless communication and
feedback paths between the organizations.
Two organizations are involved throughout the four processes: IT and WWP. IT
provides the information-management infrastructure to maintain product files and part
databases. WWP (Worldwide Procurement) is responsible for the high-level design and
strategic management of the entire supply chain. Its functions include establishing the
supplier base, negotiating supplier contracts and pricing, and allocating a percentage of
Dell's total purchases to each supplier. WWP has a strategic role, and is not involved in
the day-to-day purchasing and expediting of materials.
8 Note that IT costs are in reality distributed among many organizations. Conceptually, though, it is useful
to aggregate them into the single entity shown on Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Overview of supply chain processes
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2.1.1 Part Number Creation Process
A new-part introduction results in significant work by engineering, marketing, and other
organizations. Because these upstream costs vary greatly from part to part, a model
would not have accurately represented the true cost of any given part. More importantly,
these costs are generally visible and already accounted for, so there is no need to model
them. These upstream costs were therefore left outside the scope of the model. After
these processes have been completed, the product file, including its Bill of Materials
(BOM), is distributed throughout the organization, including Supply Chain Management
(SCM).
2.1.2 Planning Process
After a part is created, it becomes part of the planning process. The long lead times
inherent in the computer supply chain force Dell to forecast demand and order parts with
a far longer horizon than the two hours used for stocking the factory. This quarterly
forecasting process begins with Sales, which passes the forecast to the Center of
Competence (CoC), where it is adjusted and passed on to SCM. After further hedging,
SCM issues purchase orders (POs), which are used by suppliers to schedule their
production up to three months ahead of time. Although Dell does not take ownership of
incoming material until it physically enters the factory, these purchase orders represent a
contractual commitment to purchase a given amount. While Dell generally applies
pressure on suppliers to absorb excess material when the forecast proves to be too high
and efforts to stimulate consumer demand are ineffective, suppliers have on occasion
used this contractual obligation to force Dell to absorb the loss.
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2.1.3 Manufacturing Process
While Dell orders material to forecast during the planning process, it pulls material to
order as part of the manufacturing process. This process starts with a customer order,
which is processed by Sales before being passed to the factory. The factory then updates
its manufacturing plan, and schedules production of the system within the five-day order-
to-ship target. A few hours before it is ready to assemble the system, the factory releases
material from the hub, which sends trucks to the factory every two hours. The hub is a
warehouse, operated by a third party under contract to Dell, in which suppliers hold
inventory until it is pulled by the factory; all inventory in the hub is supplier owned. Dell
takes ownership as the material passes the factory door, and places the boxes on the pick-
to-light racks of each assembly line. After assembly, the system is shipped to the
customer through the carrier selected by Logistics. The Logistics group also negotiates
contracts with carriers for shipments from suppliers to the hubs.
At the same time, SCM continuously monitors inventory in the hub, and issues daily
orders to suppliers to release part of the material that had been ordered when the PO was
issued. While SCM has traditionally managed inventory to maintain 10 days' sales in
inventory (DSI) in the hubs, suppliers, which must cover the carrying costs, frequently
save money by maintaining less inventory while still ensuring adequate service levels,
based on their experience with the uncertainty of Dell's demand. Apparently, suppliers
are managing inventory to maintain a desired service level, while Dell generally tries to
maintain a fixed level of inventory. While there was an effort underway to explicitly
change the focus of SCM's inventory-management efforts, this had not been
implemented at the time of writing.
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If the parts necessary to fulfill customer orders are not available from the supplier, and
expediting efforts fail, SCM responds by managing customer demand to match the
available supply. In this case, a signal is sent to the CoC, which generates pricing
incentives or promotions to try to steer customers away from the scarce components.
This ability to quickly and precisely manage the demand and supply of every part in the
computer is seen as one of the keys to Dell's success.
2.1.4 Service Process
After selling a computer, Dell must maintain a spare-parts inventory through the duration
of the longest warranty, normally three to five years after the product's introduction. Dell
can continue to buy some of these components during the warranty period, but it must
buy a lifetime inventory of those that are discontinued. This inventory is also replenished
by parts that have been refurbished after being removed from repaired systems. The
service inventory thus consists of a small safety stock of parts that are available on the
market, a large long-term stock of discontinued parts, and a number of used parts.
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2.2 MODEL APPLICATION
Before examining the cost incurred by each of the organizations shown in Figure 5, it is
important to consider the model's ultimate application, which dictates how precisely
these costs have to be calculated. As described in section 2.3, accurately accounting for
all of the differences between parts would have required a highly complex model or
collection of models. Because time constraints made this approach impractical, it was
necessary to strike a balance in the model between accuracy and simplicity.
A lack of time is not, however, a valid reason to avoid developing a complex model, if it
is in fact necessary. A more important issue is the level of complexity that is necessary
or appropriate for the model's ultimate application. A number of considerations led to
the decision to keep the model simple, at the expense of some accuracy.
First, the cost model will only be used to identify parts for further evaluation, not as an
automatic filter to eliminate unprofitable parts. Subjective concerns, such as perceived
customer needs or long-term strategic considerations, will ultimately carry more weight
in the decision. There is no point quantifying the cost with high precision when the
resulting number will be just one input - albeit an important one - to a fundamentally
subjective decision. The case of 64MB memory modules provides a good example of
such a situation. These modules, which had already been superceded by several
generations of technology, commanded very low margins, and appeared to be losing
money. However, these low-cost parts allowed Dell to advertise low-end systems for
only $599, which was important not only because it helped reinforce Dell's reputation for
value, but also because many customers who were attracted by the low price were
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subsequently convinced to buy to more expensive systems. In general, such subjective
considerations turn out to be more important than the quantifiable costs and benefits of
each individual peripheral.
Additionally, the model has to be easily understood if it is to be credible. Most people
would not take the time to understand an intricate model, but would not be inclined to
accept its output on faith if they did not know how it was derived. Given the alternative
of a highly accurate model that is never used, it is preferable to use an imperfect model
whose assumptions, though broad, are understood by the user.
Finally, the model has to be maintainable. Given the rapid pace of change at Dell, the
inputs to the model, such as costs and headcounts, are likely to change over time, and
should be periodically updated. Because significant resources are unlikely to be available
for this task, the model should be simple and easy to update. The goal was for one person
to spend approximately one day per year updating it.
For these reasons, the emphasis throughout the project was on keeping the model usable
and simple, while reflecting - on average - the true cost of part management. When
considering the simplifying assumptions that were incorporated into the model, it is
important to remember that the choice was not between a highly accurate model and an
approximate one. The real choice was between approximating the cost or ignoring it
entirely. Thus, the general philosophy in developing the model was that it is better to
account for costs approximately than ignore them exactly.
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In other applications, the relative importance of these factors may be different, making a
more complex (or simple# model more appropriate. The thought process behind this
tradeoff, though, will be similar.
2.3 ASSUMPTIONS
Once the general level of accuracy required from the model was understood, a number of
simplifying assumptions could be made.
Most importantly, the model provides the cost for an average part, ignoring the unique
circumstances that drive the costs of individual parts; these differences are illustrated by
several examples:
1. A single buyer for mechanicals (e.g. cables, bezels, labels) handles ten times as
many parts as a buyer for processors.
2. The standard deviation of the forecast error varies by as much as a factor of five
for different memory parts.
3. Expediting charges for a single chassis part exceeded the average per-part amount
by five orders of magnitude.
4. Dell is liable for Excess & Obsolete (E&O) charges on Dell-specific chassis parts,
while commodities such as memory can always be sold on the spot market when
they are no longer needed.
Accounting for all of these variables would have required a multi-dimensional matrix of
independent models. By averaging out the costs over different part types, the problem
was simplified to the four scenarios of the two-by-two matrix shown on Table 1. The
columns define the timing of the decision: the first column shows the lifetime cost of
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introducing a new part, while the second column shows the lifetime cost of retaining an
existing part (at this time, some costs have been sunk and are therefore irrelevant). The
rows define two types of parts in terms of the decision being made. In the first case, the
decision is whether to offer a single part or nothing at all, so the decision to add the new
part does not affect any existing parts. An example of this type of part is a Bluetooth
card: if it is introduced, a certain number will be sold, but if it is not introduced the
demand for Bluetooth cards will not affect demand for other peripherals. In the second
case, the decision is whether to offer a selection between two parts or just a single part,
satisfying the same total demand in either case. For example, every computer needs a
graphics card, but Dell could either force every customer to buy the same model, or it
could offer a selection of graphics cards. For simplicity, the top-left scenario is used as
the baseline in quantifying the cost; this value is then adjusted to describe the other three
scenarios.
Before Part Introduction After Part Introduction
Unique Model 1 Model 1
(1 part instead of none) (Baseline) Minus sunk costs
Replaceable Model 2 Model 2
(2 parts instead of 1) Minus sunk costs
Table 1: Cost model scenarios
Another simplification is that all headcount costs are allocated to part numbers as linear
functions, rather than the step functions that would more accurately represent the fact that
the company does not pay for a fractional worker as the workload goes up, but rather
allows the workload to accumulate until an employee is hired. This type of cost
allocation is a standard practice, and yields a reasonable approximation.
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The third assumption, described in detail in section 2.4.5.1, is that overall inventory
levels are left unchanged when a new part is introduced in ther eplaceablescenarios of
Table 1. Starting from the baseline that a given total demand is fulfilled with a single
part, an additional part is introduced so that the same total demand is now divided
between the two part numbers, each of which has its own independent demand function.
The resulting decline in forecast accuracy can be dealt with in one of two ways:
increasing inventory to maintain the previous service level, or keeping total inventory
constant and accepting a decline in service level. The model assumes that the second
approach is taken, but both methods are described in detail in section 2.4.5.
The fourth assumption is that the Dell corporate working average cost of capital (WACC)
can be used to approximate the cost of the working capital tied up in inventory, called
inventory holding cost in this thesis. The WACC represents the opportunity cost of
tying up capital in inventory instead of investing it in a project with a risk profile typical
for Dell. In reality, some types of parts will represent a lower risk than a typical Dell
investment because they can be resold on the secondary market, while others will carry a
higher risk because they have highly unpredictable demand and limited resale value.
Therefore, theoretically, a different risk-adjusted opportunity cost could be assigned to
each class of inventory. This would clearly have been unrealistic, and was in any event
unnecessary, as it would have only resulted in a very marginal improvement to a few line
items of the total part-management cost. Given the facts that Dell at the time held large
9 In some contexts, holding cost would include expenses such as storage charges and obsolescence that are
accounted for separately in this model.
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cash reserves that earned a far lower return than the WACC, and that any additional cash
for inventory would come from these reserves, one could also make the argument that the
true opportunity cost of inventory is this (lower) rate of return on cash. This argument,
however, ignores the fact that, because inventory carries a higher risk than cash, any
investment in inventory should also yield a higher return. For these reasons, a single
opportunity cost, the WACC, was used as a reasonable approximation of the opportunity
cost of holding inventory.
Counting the number of parts, which might appear straightforward, actually required a
number of assumptions. The basic problem is that the Dell part database contains many
parts that do not add to the company's costs, for example obsolete parts that are no longer
in the inventory, supplier-managed parts (e.g. screws and labels) that are not tracked by
Dell, and customer bundles. The parts list was pared down to approximately 2,600 parts
by applying several filter criteria to the database:
1. Only parts with an open purchase order or forecast over the following 20 weeks
2. No supplier-managed parts
3. No bundles or subassemblies
4. No DellPlus (customer-specific) parts
Six more assumptions were used in developing the model:
1. The average part is in production for one year.
2. The average part is then in the service process for an additional 2-3 years.
3. Only Dell Americas Operations are accounted for.
4. Sales expenses are excluded.
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5. Only costs downstream of engineering and part qualification are modeled.
6. Tooling expenses are excluded.
The last two assumptions relate to costs that are generally known for each specific case;
these were left out of the model because there is no need to estimate costs that can be
counted directly.
2.4 COST DRIVERS
Only after mapping the work involved in managing parts and determining the level of
accuracy required in this application was it possible to quantify each of the contributions
to the total part-management cost. The problem was divided in terms of the
organizations shown on Figure 5; each of the blocks was examined separately, and is
described in a subsection below.
The general approach was to first interview people in each organization, focusing on how
to quantify their own part-management costs. These interviews often provided new ideas
for other possible cost drivers, each of which was carefully considered, even when it was
apparent that it was not significant or even relevant. This approach helped ensure that the
model was exhaustive (within the constraints described in section 2.3) and, more
importantly, would be viewed within the organization as being exhaustive. After all of
the potential costs had been gathered, they were ranked, and only the most important ones
were included in the final model; this aggregation process is described in section 2.5.
Some costs do not vary with the annual consumption of a part; for example, the workload
in the Worldwide Procurement organization is the same regardless of how many graphics
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cards of a given model are shipped every year. Other costsvary with production volume,
and are scaled bthe annual material spend ing on the part; for example, the likelihood of
losing a sale because a particular graphics card is out of stock increases with the
percentage of computers ordered with that card.
2.4.1 WWP
The Worldwide Procurement (WWP) cost is a straightforward allocation of headcount
spending. Because the department has global responsibilities, only the portion of the
budget allocated to Dell Americas Operations was considered. This was then multiplied
by 40 to 80%, which covers the range of reasonable assumptions about the proportion of
employees' time that would be affected by the addition or removal of parts. Finally, this
part-management budget was divided by the number of parts to arrive at the per-part cost.
2.4.2 IT
The cost of maintaining the IT infrastructure was found by combining the operating and
capital budgets of the departments responsible for all of the parts databases, and dividing
by the total number of parts stored in those databases. The cost per part ended up being
trivial.
2.4.3 CoC
Center of Competence (CoC) cost is another headcount allocation. The total
departmental budget was divided by the number of parts. Because the resulting cost was
trivial, there was no need to make assumptions about the proportion of workload affected
by part numbers.
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2.4.4 Supply Chain Management
The cost of Supply Chain Management (SCM) is also headcount allocation; the total
departmental budget was simply divided by the number of parts. Because SCM is
responsible for the day-to-day management of suppliers and inventories, it was
reasonable to assume that its entire workload was driven by the number of parts.
2.4.5 Hub
The hub was the most important cost driver, not only because of its impact on the total
cost per part, but also because of the work required to quantify the cost. As described in
section 2.1.3, the hub is a warehouse that is run by a third party under contract to Dell.
All suppliers are expected to maintain a Dell-mandated level of safety stock in the hub,
traditionally ten days' sales in inventory (DSI). Because inventory remains on suppliers'
books until it physically enters the factory several hours before system assembly,
suppliers have a strong incentive to limit hub inventory, and frequently maintain
significantly less than ten DSI.
In the context of the cost model, the important issue is not the absolute level of inventory,
but the change in inventory when a new part number is added. Figure 6 shows the
incremental effect on inventory of offering a choice between two parts instead of offering
a common part; this corresponds to the replaceable scenario of Table 1.
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Figure 6: Inventory effect of offering 2 parts instead of 1
The demands for each of the separate parts (d, and d2), as well as the common part (dc),
are unpredictable, and are assumed to follow a normal distribution. This demand consists
of a forecast (F), which is assumed to be non-random because it is based on long-term
trends instead of short-term demand fluctuations, and a normally distributed forecast
error (e). Assuming that the introduction of the separate parts does not lead to any
change in overall sales, the relationship between the common part's forecast error (e)
and that of the separate parts (e, and e2) can be found as follows:
dc =dl +d 2 because d = F + e,
Fc + ec = (Fj + el) + (F2 + e2) because unchanging overall sales imply
thatF c = F1 + F2,
F1 +F2 + ec = F +F 2 + e1 + e2
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Because the variance of the sum of the individual forecast errors (ec = el + e2) is equal to
the sum of the variances of the individual errors, the standard deviation of the overall
forecast error (Fc) equals o + U2 . If demand between the two parts is evenly split,
The standard deviation of forecast error drives the safety stock required to maintain a
given service level, as described in Section 2.4.5.1. Figure 6 shows that, in order to
maintain a fixed service level, inventory levels must be increased when a common part
(whose safety stock is driven by Tc) is replaced by two parts (whose safety stock is driven
by 2au = 2c2 = 2 /a,  = a, V).
There are two ways to deal with the increased forecast uncertainty arising from the
addition of a new part: maintaining a constant service level by increasing inventory
levels (as shown on Figure 6), and accepting a decline in service level while keeping
inventory fixed. For the sake of simplicity, these choices are assumed to be mutually
exclusive, so there can be no partial increase in inventory levels combined with a partial
decline in service level. Additionally, it is assumed that a stockout of the part in question
always results in lost sales, as customers will not accept a substitute part. Section 2.4.5.1
addresses the fixed-inventory assumption that was used in the final model, while Section
2.4.5.2 describes the constant service-level assumption thatwas not used but could serve
as an alternative under other circumstances.
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2.4.5.1 Fixed Inventory Assumption
Under the fixed-inventory assumption, Dell responds to the added uncertainty associated
with an additional part by maintaining overall inventory levels fixed, and accepting a
decline in service level. This decline in service level results in two types of cost: factory
overtime and lost sales, both of which are scaled bythe annual material expenditure on
the part. These costs are different for the unique and replaceable scenarios of Table 1,
and are described separately below.
Unique Scenarios
After a stockout incident, the factory often runs overtime shifts to catch up with its
backlog. Because overtime is also driven by other causes, which are not tracked, the only
way to find the annual overtime expense related to stockouts was to ask a factory
scheduler to provide a subjective estimate of the proportion of overtime attributable to
stockouts. This value was multiplied by total annual overtime spending, and the result
was divided by the number of parts to arrive at the average per-part overtime cost under
the unique scenarios.
While it is impossible to precisely quantify how many sales are lost as a result of quoting
customers extended lead times in response to a part shortage, the CoC was able to
provide a reasonable estimate based on their assessment of several specific incidents in
which lead times exceeded two weeks - well above Dell's standard five days. For each
incident, the sales forecast was treated as the trend (after controlling for forecast
inaccuracy by comparing to actual sales before and after the lead time incident), and the
shortfall in actual sales during the incident was attributed to the stockouts. As with the
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factory overtime, this total cost was divided by the number of parts to arrive at a per-part
cost for the unique scenarios, relying on the implicit assumption that each part has an
equal probability of causing such an incident.
Replaceable Scenarios
The stockout cost under the replaceable scenarios was found by first determining the
increase in stockouts as the new part is added, and then quantifying the additional costs
associated with these stockouts.
The increase in stockouts was found using a model that had been used at Dell to evaluate
the impact on service levels ofchanges to inventory policy This model was based on the
standard safety-stock equation for a continuous-review inventory policy with stochastic
lead times, which is described in detail by Simchi-Levi'0 et al.:
10 David Simchi-Levi, Philip Kaminsky, and Edith Simchi-Levi, Designing & Managing the Supply Chain:
Concepts, Strategies & Case Studies, 2"d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 58-62.
Note that Simchi-Levi et al. use the standard deviation of demand instead of the standard deviation of
forecast error, as was done here. The use of forecast error is an extension of the equation for situations, like
this, in which the forecast varies with time.
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SafetyStock = zo x Mkex ea2dime
zo = z-value of the standard normal distribution such that P(z < zo) = service level
p-leadtime = mean supplier lead time
Gleadtime standard deviation of supplier lead time
p-demand = mean demand
3 error = standard deviation of forecast error
Because gathering information on the last four inputs was a very time-consuming
process, a single commodity, memory, was selected as a proxy for all other parts. It is
impossible to directly measure pleadtime and Cyleadtime, so the master scheduler for memory
provided a range of reasonable values based on his judgment. For example, lead time is
nominally three months, but the scheduler said that he can always get any part he needs
within three to six weeks, so the best- and worst-case values for p-leadtime were three and
six weeks. Similarly, the scheduler estimated Gleadtime to be between two and five days;
this value represents the variation about the promised lead times (pIeadtime) of three to six
weeks. The standard deviation of the forecast error (Gerror) was found by reviewing
available historical data for 20 memory parts that the master scheduler felt were
representative of the spectrum of memory parts, and calculating the pooled variance
based on the 10-20 weeks of available data. These model inputs closely matched those
for a collection of five hard-drive parts, verifying that the memory parts were reasonably
representative of all part types.
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The best- and worst-case values of these four inputs were applied to the inventory model
to calculate the safety stock needed to maintain a reasonable range of service levels (95-
99%) for a typical part. The demand for that hypothetical average part was then split into
two independent and equal demand functions, so that the mean demand of each equals
half the mean demand of the combined part. As explained in Section 2.4.5, each of the
parts would then have a forecast error with a standard deviation of o = (T = cc 7-li,
where ac represents the forecast error of the combined part. The updated standard
deviation of the forecast error (terror), the updated mean demand (pdemand), and the original
values of lead-time mean and standard deviation (pieadtime and cleadtime) were then applied
to the model to find the service level with two parts. This value was compared to the
service level with a single part to find the decline in service level after a single part is
replaced by two.
Finally, the factory overtime and lost sales amounts from the unique scenarios were
multiplied by the decline in service level resulting from the addition of the second part to
arrive at the cost under the replaceable scenarios.
2.4.5.2 Constant SEvice Level Assumption
While the assumption of a constant service level was not used in the final model, it is
presented here because it represents an alternate way of calculating cost, and provides
some useful lessons about the problem. Under this assumption, a cost is incurred only
under the replaceable scenarios of Table 1, in which the baseline condition is that all
demand is met by a single part. Each of the two parts' suppliers will charge for the cost
of managing its total inventory, which includes both the inventory necessary in the
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baseline condition and the additional inventory necessary to support the decision to offer
two separate parts, so the incremental cost of offering two parts instead of one is not
visible and must be included in the cost model. Under the unique scenarios, the baseline
is not having any part at all, so the cost of maintaining inventory for a single part is
embedded in the single supplier's material cost, which would be considered separately
from the cost model.
The inventory model described in Section 2.4.5.1 could first be used to find the additional
safety stock needed to maintain a fixed service level after the new part is added This
increase in inventory then results in two costs: working capital and storage charges. The
cost of working capital, i.e. inventory holding cost, could be found by multiplying the
value of the additional inventory by the company's working average cost of capital
(WACC), which represents the opportunity cost of tying up capital in inventory instead of
investing in a different project with a risk profile equivalent to that of the company as a
whole. The reasons for using the WACC as the opportunity cost were described in
section 2.3.
Storage charges assessed by Dell's warehouse contractor are the second cost associated
with the additional inventory. While Dell's current contract with the warehouse operator
stipulates a charge on each pallet that is shipped through the hub, regardless of the
storage time, it is clear that increasing the average storage time per pallet by adding to the
days' sales in inventory represents a cost to the supply chain that will eventually be
passed on to Dell. In order to avoid the need to revisit the constantly renegotiated
storage-pricing scheme every time the model is updated, Dell's blanket cost of factory
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space of $3.00 per square foot per month could be used. This pricing structure presents a
problem, as the model's user must now know not only how much is spent on a part, but
also the floor space occupied by the part.
These items represent the costs to Dell's entire supply chain of holding the inventory
necessary to maintain service levels after the addition of a single part number. Because
Dell does not take ownership of the inventory until it passes the factory loading dock a
few hours before assembly, though, it is not entirely clear how much of this cost increase
is absorbed by suppliers and how much is passed on to Dell through higher material
pricing. One could assume that some reasonable fraction is passed on, for example 75-
100%.
The constant-service-level assumption was challenged bythe belief that any costs that are
passed on to suppliers do not affect Dell, and should not be considered. It proved to be
very difficult to get those few individuals who believed this to change their minds. In
order to avoid the issue, as well as the need for awareness of the floor space occupied by
a part, the fixed-inventory assumption of Section 2.4.5.1 was used in the final model.
2.4.6 Logistics
The addition of a new part results in added forecast uncertainty, as described in the
preceding section, resulting in more frequent expediting of material. Although in reality
only a limited set of part categories (such as chasses and speakers) require expediting, all
parts are assumed to be equally likely to result in expediting expense. This is a result of
the general decision, discussed in Section 2.3, to develop a single model for all part
categories. The cost for a unique part (as defined in Table 1) was found by dividing total
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annual expediting expenditure by the number of parts, and scaling this value by each
part's annual material spending. The cost for a replaceable part was found by
multiplying this value by the increased probability of stockouts when twqpart s are used
instead of one.
2.4.7 Factory
In addition to the overtime described in section 2.4.5.1, the factory incurs costs associated
with the kitting line, in which the components for each computer are placed on a tote for
subsequent assembly, and the boxing line, in which items such as mice and keyboards are
put into the box after system assembly. These parts are transferred by workers standing
in front of pick-to-light (PTL) racks, which indicate the part to be picked by activating a
small light. Because each worker is assigned two racks, which contain a fixed number of
lights (and part numbers), the cost of this labor is driven by the number of part numbers,
not by the volume of material being loaded onto the rack by stockers. It was therefore
included in the model by dividing the total annual labor cost by the number of parts.
2.4.8 Service
While most parts are used in production for a short time, assumed to be one year, spare
parts must be available to service the longest customer warranty for a total of up to five
years (assumed to be three to four years on average). This range was necessary because
some parts can be bought at any time, while others must be stocked for years after they
are discontinued. Three types of cost are incurred in supporting this spare-parts
inventory: headcount, capital, and excess and obsolete.
51
The lifetime headcount cost was found by subjectively estimating the fraction of the
Service organization's annual labor expenditure attributable to part numbers, dividing by
the number of parts in the service inventory, and multiplying by the three to four years
that the part is supported.
Inventory holding cost is the cost of capital (WACC) applied to the average inventory per
part, over three to four years. This inventory consists of two types of parts, each of which
has a unique cost of capital associated with it: brand-new purchased components, and
remanufactured customer returns. The cost of capital for the new components would be
the same as for production parts, and the WACC is a close approximation, as discussed in
Section 2.3. It is somewhat less clear, though, how much capital is tied up in
remanufactured parts, as these were already paid for by the customer who purchased the
original system; the real cost would depend on the proportion of remanufactured parts in
the inventory, the valuation method for those parts, and the scrap rate on returned parts,
among other factors. These issues are addressed in detail in the literature on reverse-
logistics policy, for example by Teunter and van der Laan", but are not critical in this
context, as the objective is not to define inventory policy, but to account for the costs
involved. Given this objective, the WACC can be used as a reasonable approximation for
the cost of holding all of the service inventory, regardless of its origin.
" Ruud Teunter and Erwin van der Laan, "On the Non-Optimality of the Average Cost Approach for
Inventory Models with Remanufacturing," International Journal of Production Economics, September 1,
2002, 67-73.
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To calculate the cost of excess and obsolete material (i.e. inventory write offs), the total
annual write-off amount was divided by an estimate of the number of parts that are
removed from service in any year.
2.5 MODEL RESULTS
After all of the individual cost drivers were found and quantified, they were integrated
into a comprehensive model of the cost of managing a part number. Because of the need
for simplicity in the model (see Section 2.2), the Pareto Principle, which states that 80%
of the results in a system are produced by 20% of the effort, was used to isolate the line
items that accounted for 80% of the total cost, and exclude the remainder from the model.
While it took significantly more than 20% of the total effort to arrive at 80% of the cost,
this exercise was consistent with the general spirit of the Pareto Principle. Because this
approach calls for ignoring approximately 20% of the total cost, it might appear to make
the model unnecessarily inaccurate. The high degree of uncertainty in the cost drivers,
and the resulting wide bands in the estimate, however, mean that this omission does not
significantly degrade the model's output. Figure 7 shows the cost components that are
not scaleable by the part's annual material expenditure, while Figure 8 shows those that
are scaleable; both figures also show which of the drivers were included in the final
model. One of the scenarios of Table 1, a unique part being considered before its
introduction, was used in selecting the most relevant cost drivers. All of the cost drivers
that were considered are included in Figure 7 and Figure 8; even those that are not
affected by the addition of a new part but were mentioned in the course of an interview
are shown, to demonstrate that they were considered. For the sake of brevity, most of the
costs that were excluded from the final model were not described in detail Section 2.4.
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Figure 7: Pareto diagram of non-scaleable costs
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Figure 8: Pareto diagram of scaleable costs
Figure 7 shows that four non-scaleable costs were used in the final model:
1. Worldwide Procurement (WWP) headcount
2. Factory Kitting and Boxing Labor
3. Supply chain Management (SCM) headcount
4. Service (ASD) headcount
As shown on Figure 8, four costs that scale with the part's annual material expenditure
were included in the final model:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
Service (ASD) inventory
Service (ASD) excess and obsolete (E&O)
Stockouts
Expediting
Each of these costs was then adjusted to derive the costs for the remaining three scenarios
(see Table 1). The differences between the costs associated with the introduction of a
new part and the savings from removing an existing part are shown on Table 2, while the
differences between a replaceable and a unique part are shown on Table 3.
Before Part Introduction After Part Introduction
Low High Low High
Stockouts 0.18% 0.28% Stockouts 0.18% 0.28%
ASD - inventory 0.26% 0.35% ASD - inventory 0.00% 0.18%
Expediting 0.06% 0.12% Expediting 0.06% 0.12%
ASD - E&O 0.19% 0.31% ASD - E&O 0.00% 0.16%
WVVWP $6,021 $12,043 WWP $6,021 $12,043
Kitting & Boxing $5,468 $10,973 Kitting & Boxing $5,468 %10,973
ASD - Headcount $2,350 $4,700 ASD - Headcount $2,350 $4,700
SCM $7,103 $8524 SCM $5,273 $6,328
Table 2: Timing-related differences between scenarios
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Unique Stockouts 018% 0.28%
ASD - inventory 0.26% 0.35%
Expediting 0.06% 0.12%
ASD - E&O 0.19% 0.31%
VWVP $6,021 $12,043
Kitting & Boxing $5,468 $10,937
ASD - Headcount $2,350 $4,700
SCM $7,103 $8,524
Replaceable Stockouts 0.11% 0.55%
ASD - inventory 0.05% 0.07%
Expediting 0.06% 0.12%
ASD - E&O 0.03% 0.06%
VWVP $6,021 $12,043
Kitting & Boxing $5,468 $10,937
ASD - Headcount $2,350 $4,700
SCM $7,103 $8,524
Table 3: Part-type-related differences between scenarios
The individual cost components were finally combined into two sets of coefficients -
each consisting of a low-to-high range - for each scenario: a constant dollar amount and
a percentage of the part's annual material spending. These coefficients are shown on
Table 4:
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Before Part Introduction After Part Introduction
Unique
Low High Low High
Scaleable 0.70% 1.07% Scaleable 0.24% 0.73%
Not scaleable $21,000 $36,000 Not scaleable $19,000 $34,000
Replaceable-- - - - - - -
Low High Low High
Scaleable 0.25% 0.81% Scaleable 0.17% 0.75%
Not scaleable $21,000 $36,000 Not scaleable $19,000 $34,000
Table 4: Cost model coefficients
The cost of introducing a unique part (the upper-left scenario) with aforecast annual
consumption of $5,000,000 provides an example of the application of the model:
Lifetime supply chain cost ($) = 0.70% x (annual spend) + $21,000
= 0.70% x ($5,000,000) + $21,000
= $56,000
The model was implemented as a spreadsheet with one input: the annual material
spending on the part in question. The cost output by the model can be used as an
estimate for the majority of parts, particularlythose whose low volumes do not justify the
time required for more detailed analysis. If this cost is questioned or considered
unrealistic, it can easily be exploded into its individual components for further analysis.
Finally, some parts, such as motherboards and chasses, are important enough to justify a
significant investment of time in the analysis. In this case, the model provides a
framework for evaluating the sources of cost, as well as a methodology for quantifying
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the individual cost drivers. The model is therefore useful not only for the cost estimate
that it generates, but also for the visibility it provides into the supply chain cost structure.
2.6 MODEL APPROVAL
The final step in completing the model was to have it approved by high-level
management as Dell's official cost of managing a part. Although it did not significantly
improve the model's output, this process was politically critical for the long-term
credibility of the model - without this legitimacy, the model would be questioned any
time it calls for the removal of a specific part that some constituency feels should be
retained for other reasons. Operational and financial managers from each organization
whose costs were included in the model were asked for their approval in an extended
series of individual meetings. This process caused problems when members of one of the
organizations asked to approve a single line item found that the overall model results did
not support their agenda. Because it was impractical to change the model in such a way
that their input was not needed, it became necessary to first appeal to them to
compromise, and finally to request help from management in resolving the disagreement.
This experience provides a useful illustration of the political obstacles that can obstruct
even a seemingly objective, neutral cost-accounting effort.
2.7 SUMMARY
This section described the most important output of the project: a model of the
incremental costs incurred when a single part number is added to the inventory or,
conversely, the savings associated with the removal of a single part. The model is valid
for most types of parts, including those that are engineered into a basic system and are
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never considered by customers, but its development was motivated by the need to provide
an input to a management process, described in Section 4, to eliminate unprofitable
customer options. The model was derived using a six-step process:
1. Map the supply chain process to understand where costs are incurred
2. Evaluate the model's ultimate application, to judge the accuracy required
3. Make the necessary simplifying assumptions
4. Quantify all of the cost drivers
5. Consolidate the most important cost drivers into a single model
6. Certify the model as Dell's official cost of managing a part
As it was unrealistic to precisely quantify these hidden costs, step two was critical in
determining the appropriate level of simplification. As with many cost-accounting
problems, the solution may not be perfectly accurate in every single case, but it leads to
the correct decisions, on average. This result, though not ideal, is far more desirable than
the alternative of entirely ignoring the cost of part management.
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3 CASE STUDY
The second phase of the project was to apply the cost model to historical sales data for a
sample of parts, with two objectives: to refine methodologies for selecting parts for
elimination (Section 3.1), and to determine the potential savings from the part-review
process described in Section 4, justifying its implementation (Section 3.2). September
2002 sales of Optiplex - a desktop-computer line for business customers - were
evaluated, and the results were then scaled by revenue to estimate the potential savings
across Dell's Americas operations. This relatively small sample size, which was selected
to keep the task manageable, provides sufficient information to refine the part-selection
methods and to establish a reasonably reliable business case.
3.1 PART-SELECTION METHODOLOGY
The first objective of the case study is to determine how revenue and cost should be
allocated to individual parts in order to establish which should be candidates for
elimination. The problem is presented in Section 3.1.1 and the proposed solution, which
resulted from the trial of different methods, is presented in Section 3.1.2.
3.1.1 Allocation Problem
The calculation of a part's profitability is complicated by the two problems that are
presented in the following subsections: the allocation of revenue and cost as the bill of
materials (BOM) tree is exploded, and the application of system-level discounts to
individual SKUs.
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3.1.1.1 BOM Explosion
Because revenue is earned on the stock keeping units (SKUs) at the top of the BOM tree,
while costs are incurred on the individual part numbers at the base of the tree, a
methodology had to be developed to appropriately allocate revenue and cost as the BOM
is exploded. This could be done in one of two ways: allocating SKU revenue to parts, or
allocating part costs to SKUs.
Figure 9 shows a hypothetical example of the allocation problem. Three components of
part profitability are known:
1. The revenue associated with each SKU
2. The material cost of each part number
3. The supply chain cost associated with each part number ($2 in this hypothetical
example)
Revenue
Part Revenue
Material
Supply Chain
$12 $30
SKU SKU
1 2
PN PN PN PN PN
1 2 3 4 5
$4 $4 4+10=$14 $10 $10
$1 $1 2x$6=$12 $2 $2
$2 $2 2x$2=$4 $2 $2
$1 $1 ($2) $6 $6 ($12)
Market
Factory
Supply
Chain
$42
$42
$18
Part Profit
Figure 9: Simplified example of BOM explosion
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Without making any assumptions about the revenue-allocation method, the total profit
from selling these two SKUs is $12. The simple approach of allocating the revenue from
each of the two SKUs evenly to each of its constituent parts results in the per-part profit
shown on the bottom row. Under this methodology, part 3 appears to be unprofitable,
and would therefore be eliminated. As a consequence of this decision, however, neither
SKU 1 nor SKU 2 could be manufactured, resulting in an overall profit of $0 instead of
$12; the entire exercise was therefore counterproductive.
A possible solution to this problem would be to allocate revenue to each part number in
proportion to its cost. Examples could easily be shown, though, in which this method
also results in unprofitable decisions.
As an alternative to directly identifying part numbers for elimination, as in the preceding
example, unprofitable SKUs could be identified. Any part numbers that were not used by
the remaining - profitable - SKUs would then be removed from the lineup. This indirect
method of identifying candidates has the advantage of entirely avoiding the cost-revenue-
allocation problem, as the cost of every part can be clearly and unambiguously associated
with the SKU with which it was sold. The only significant drawback is that the
elimination of a part depends on the elimination of every single SKU that uses that part in
its BOM; as long as a part is needed by a single SKU, it has to be retained.
The example of Figure 9 showed a simplified scenario with only two SKUs. In reality, as
illustrated in Figure 10, there will be many more relationships between SKUs and part
numbers, further complicating the problem.
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Revenue $12 $30 $42
SKU SKU
Market 1 2
Factory ****--j 
--- - : - . :- 
-- ------ 
---- 
---
SuPN PN PN PN PNSupply 1 2 3 4 5
Part Revenue $4 $4 4+10=$14 $10 $10 $42
Material $1 $1 2x$6=$12 $2 $2 $18
Supply Chain $2 $2 2x$2=$4 $2 $2
Part Profit $1 $1 ($2) $6 $6 $12
Figure 10: Extended example of BOM explosion
3.1.1.2 Allocation of System Discounts
Figure 11 shows an example of the second problem associated with determining part
profitability: the allocation of system discounts. Due to limitations in Dell's order-
management software, as well as simple convenience, sales people often assign
discounts, which they offer as an inducement to purchase an entire system, to a single
SKU within the system (for example a monitor or DVD drive). In this example, they
assign the entire $30 system discount to SKU 3, making it appear unprofitable. Clearly,
it would be ideal to distribute this discount among all three SKUs in order to present a
more realistic picture. Because the order-management software is outside the scope of
this project, though, it is necessary to accept the fact that some SKUs will have
unrealistically high discounts assigned to them, and find another way of dealing with the
problem.
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Full Price $90
Discounted Price $60
System
SKU SKU SKU
1 2 3
SKU Full Revenue $30 $30 $30
SKU Discounted Revenue $30 $30 $0
Figure 11: Allocation of discounts
3.1.2 Proposed Allocation Methodology
Given the scale of the problems presented in the previous sections, with thousands of
relationships between SKUs and part numbers and millions of individual transaction
discounts, it is clearly unrealistic to precisely determine the profitability of each part.
Instead, it is more appropriate to find a generalized allocation methodology that on
average provides the correct guidance, even though it may be incorrect in specific
instances. This philosophy, which was also applied to the cost model of Section 2, is a
common way of addressing the problems inherent in all cost-accounting exercises. After
accepting that the allocation method has to provide, at best, an approximation, it is
important to apply the method to real data in order to determine whether the level of
inaccuracy is acceptable.
As mentioned in Section 3.1.1.1, the preferred method for identifying parts for
elimination would be based on eliminating unprofitable SKUs, retaining only the parts
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that are used in the remaining SKUs, and removing the unused parts. Because no part
can be removed if it is used by any remaining SKUs, it is important to apply this
technique to real sales data in order to determine whether it results in the elimination of a
sufficient number of parts.
Sales figures for each SKU, which included shipped volume, revenue, and material cost,
were first gathered from the appropriate database (called the Data Warehouse). A
separate database was then used to find every SKU to part number relationship, allowing
the SKU sales figures to be exploded into individual part numbers. The third step was to
compare these figures, which were derived from the sales database, with the version from
the factory's own database. Because the factory list turned out to be incomplete due to
the exclusion of several classes of parts, the sales figures from the Data Warehouse were
used for the analysis.
This conversion of SKU sales data to part shipments might at first sight appear to be the
most straightforward part of the case study, but it was actually the most difficult.
Because Dell does not use a centralized Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system, the
data had to be gathered from five independent databases that often yielded contradictory
data. This lack of readily available, reliable data was a hindrance not only in this project,
but in several others that the author heard about at Dell. While this could be interpreted
as a necessary - if unfortunate - side effect of Dell's highly flexible, fast-paced business
model, the problem is actually more widespread; at Kodak, a mature business,
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Rockwell's' 2 implementation of a centralized database provided visibility to the product
portfolio for the first time, leading to the realization of previously unseen part-
consolidation opportunities. Dell had attempted an implementation of SAP, a leading
ERP product, in the early 1990s, and had concluded that the software could not be
adopted without sacrificing some of the flexibility that provided the foundation of Dell's
success. The suitability of ERP systems in this type of environment is beyond the scope
of this discussion; given the constraints of the existing infrastructure, it was necessary to
manually gather the data and make assumptions to overcome the contradictions between
the various databases.
The relationships among the various data sets are shown on Figure 12 to illustrate the
complexity of the data-gathering problem.
1 Clinton J. Rockwell, "A Framework For Optimizing the Supply Chain: A Case Study
at Kodak" (LFM Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002).
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2,256 SKU-Mod pairs
SKU-Mod-PN conversion 754 SKUs
684 SKUs 442 Mods
403 Mods
SCM 497 PNsD3S swihct/a-1
SKU-Mod conversion 13 SKts with cost/margin
311,761 SKU-Mod pairs O
76,156 MKd 27,969 records
4406 SKUs
- -- D-3 relevano 'Us
754 SKUs
SCM Daily Supply S tus
9.374 PNs
Factory ships
250 PNs
anm 000
SKU-Mod-PN
Wit ut PNs with qty. 0
679 SKUs
311 PNs
SCM 457 SKUS
Mod-PN conversion SKU-Mod PN 214 \lods
750,366 Mod-PN pairs Without subassemblies 9
158,015 Mods Without PNs with qty.0 SKU-Mod-PN
125,475 PNs 601 SKUs On SCM Daily Supply Status
324 Mods 621 SKUs
202 PNs 239 PNs
Figure 12: Databases for case study
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The next step was to assign cost to each SKU, using the resulting SKUprofit to identify
candidates for elimination. Given the uncertainty in determining SK10rofitability, b est-
and worst-case scenarios were used to provide a more realistic estimate of the potential
savings. The discount-allocation problem described in section 3.1.1.2 was solved by
using the retail price of each SKU as the high estimate of revenue, and the discounted
price as the low estimate; the real revenue would lie somewhere in between if system
discounts were properly allocated to the constituent SKUs. Like the revenue, the material
cost of the parts constituting each SKU was then found directly in the Data Warehouse.
The supply chain cost of each part constituting a SKU was found using the cost model of
Section 2, with the non-scaleable portion allocated evenly to all SKUs using the part, and
the scaleable portion applied to the part's material spending for the SKU in question.
Unprofitable SKUs were then found by subtracting these material and supply chain costs
from SKU revenue. Once the unprofitable SKUs were removed from the list, the parts
needed to support the remaining SKUs were found. The parts present in the original list,
but not this reduced list, could then be removed, as shown on Figure 13. These
candidates for elimination were used as the input for the financial analysis of the
following section.
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327-442 SKUs
eliminated
Existing
Total
T48~
Rema--- -----
5Vges4 _ __ _ _
SKUs Parts
Figure 13: Case study results (not to scale)
Because this analysis demonstrated that evaluating SKUs for profitability resulted in a
significant reduction in the part count, it proved to be unnecessary to develop a
methodology for assigning revenue to part numbers in order to evaluate individual parts
for profitability. While screening SKUs was adequate in this application, it is possible
that this approach would not work in other situations, for example when each part is used
by many SKUs, some of which are profitable. The suitability of each approach depends
on the structure of the bill of materials.
3.2 BUSINESS CASE
The second objective of the case study was to quantify the potential savings from
eliminating unprofitable peripherals, justifying the implementation of a management
process - described in Section 4 - to proactively evaluate all peripherals for suitability.
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104-120 parts
eliminated
601 202
Figure 14 shows the results of the case study, including the identification of parts shown
on Figure 13.
601 202
Existing
Total
274 98
-----~---
Optiplex possible annual
savings
(supply chain costs):
$1.7m - $3.4m
Assume 10-50% of
candidates actually
eliminated
Optiplex annual Dell Americas
savings: Annual Savings:
$0.2m - $1.7m $0.6m - 6.1m
SKUs PNs
Figure 14: Case study results
The first step was to calculate the savings from removing the 104 to 120 unprofitable
parts identified in the preceding section (see Figure 13). The assumption that all demand
for a discontinued part would be displaced to another part helped to provide a
conservative estimate, as it meant that only the non-scaleable component of supply chain
cost was considered; the scaleable component would simply shift to the substitute part
(see Section 2.5 for a full description of the cost components).
The preceding analysis revealed the potential savings from removing all parts that appear
to be unprofitable. In reality, many of these parts would be retained after closer analysis,
for example because they are needed for a broader strategic objective or because the
revenue recorded in the database does not reflect their true importance. Because resource
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constraints ruled out a thorough part-by part evaluation, it was conservatively assumed
that, after closer evaluation, only 10-50% of these parts would actually be removed.
Finally, the potential savings from the single product line used in the case study were
extrapolated across all products, based on the revenue of each product. This resulted in
potential annual savings of $600,000 to $1,600,000 in Dell Americas Operations; the
potential global savings would be higher, but were outside the scope of this project.
Given Dell's billions of dollars in annual revenues in the Americas, $600,000 to
$1,600,000 does not represent a dramatic change to the economics of the business. This
level of savings, though, is consistent with other efforts under way at the time. The
consensus at Dell was that there were few dramatic savings opportunities left in this
maturing business, and that the key to Dell's continued cost competitiveness was the
aggregate effect of hundreds of relatively modest cost-reduction efforts. Viewed in this
context, the potential savings from proactively limiting part proliferation are significant,
and justify the implementation of a systematic process to manage theoptions catalog.
Because this analysis was based on conservative estimates, the true savings are in fact
likely to be higher.
3.3 SUMMARY
The first objective of the case study was to use the supply chain cost model ofSection 2
to refine methodologies for identifying unprofitable parts that should be removed from
the lineup, so that these methodologies could be integrated in the management process
described in Section 4. The case study provided solutions to the two problems associated
with calculating part profitability: the explosion of the BOM between revenue-earning
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SKUs and the part numbers that incur costs, and the allocation of transaction discounts.
The evaluation of a limited sample of historical sales data demonstrated that SKUs
should be evaluated for profitability, and that only the parts needed to support the
remaining profitable SKUs should be retained. The second objective was to establish a
business case for the implementation of the management process described in the
following section. While the potential $600,000 to $1,600,000 savings would not
fundamentally change the nature of a multi-billion-dollar business, their scale is
consistent with other cost-management efforts under way, which in combination will
further improve Dell's cost competitiveness.
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4 MANAGEMENT PROCESS
The final phase of the project was to develop a set of management procedures to
proactively review all peripherals and eliminate those that are unnecessary or
inappropriate. The management process relies on the cost model developed in Section 2
to determine the cost of maintaining a part, as well as the methodology of Section 3.1.2 to
calculate part profitability. This quantitative information is supplemented by strategic
and marketing analyses, providing a comprehensive overview of each part. The
implementation of these procedures is justified by the case study of Section 3.2.
While the first two phases of the project (Cost Model and Case Study) were completed,
the objective of this phase was to provide general recommendations that would be
subsequently implemented by a Dell team.
4.1 EXISTING PROCESS
Because a stand-alone process would run the risk of being forgotten - or ignored - as
those responsible for performing the work focused on their everyday priorities, it is
important to integrate the part-review process into the company's existing procedures.
The Phase Review Process (PRP) is a set of guidelines and procedures that govern the
life cycles of all Dell products, from the early conceptual stage through obsolescence.
The PRP is based on the concept on the Core Team, on which all organizations withi
major stake in the product are represented, and which is ultimately responsible for the
product. Organizations with an indirect role have places on Extended Core Teams, which
in turn have a representative on the Core Team. There are three types of Core Team:
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Peripheral, Platform, and Sustaining. Peripheral Core Teams are responsible for an entire
class of peripherals, e.g. network cards, graphics cards, or monitors, and control each
peripheral throughout its life cycle. Platform and Sustaining Core Teams, on the other
hand, are responsible for a specific PC model, and are disbanded when they are finished
with that platform. The Platform Core Team is responsible for the commercialization of
a product, and hands it over to the Sustaining Core Team upon its production release. As
this project is focused on peripherals, the Peripheral Core Team is the most important in
this context.
4.2 PROPOSED PROCESS
The proposed part-review process, shown on Figure 15, is based on a review of every
peripheral, both before its production release and periodically during its production life.
Profile, Planning, and Implementation are the three phases of the PRP that take place
before a product is introduced to the market, and are described in Section 4.2.1. These
are followed by the Deployment and Management phases described in Section 4.2.2,
which lead to the end of production life in the Service phase of Section 4.2.3.
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Profile/ Planning/ Implementation Deployment / Management
Periodic
Review
ta-Attach Break- - Dcso
RdwnPart Dion ino/roe
Break- Strat-
kt. Even egic
corsts
Red: non-existent info/process
Service
EOL
Figure 15: Proposed management process
4.2.1 Profile, Planning, and Implementation Phases
As shown on Figure 15, the decision to introduce a peripheral starts with a strategic
analysis of the target market space. This is followed by a financial analysis, denoted
Breakeven Analysis in the diagram, involving forecasts of volumes, margins, and
development costs. Finally, the decision on the peripheral's introduction is made by the
appropriate Peripheral Core Team before transfer to the Deployment phase. This is the
point at which a peripheral starts to incur costs; it is the transition between the left and
right columns of Table 1.
Because the PRP already incorporates reasonably robust proesses for introducing new
peripherals, the only necessary change would be the inclusion of the indirect costs
incurred by the supply chain as a result of the decision to add the new peripheral (S.C.
Cost on Figure 15). This input, which is currently not considered, would be provided by
the cost model of Section 2.
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4.2.2 Deployment and Management Phases
Production starts and the first customers receive their systems at the beginning of the
Deployment phase, meaning that some costs, such as production inventories and
customer warranties, have been sunk. The savings from eliminating a part would
therefore be lower than they would have been if the decision had been taken sooner.
The next opportunity to remove a part would be during the Management phase, in which
a part is sustained for ongoing production and sale. This phase represents the bulk of a
product's life (while the cost model assumes that it lasts one year, it could potentially go
on for longer). As mentioned in Section 1.2, the default condition in the Management
phase is for a part to remain in the catalog indefinitely, until somebody initiates a blanket
part-cleanup effort. The proposed procedures would replace this ad hoc process with a
systematic, planned review of every individual peripheral. This process could initially
take place at monthly intervals, which could later be extended to quarterly periods as the
most wasteful parts made their way through the system and there were fewer parts
needing review.
The process shown on Figure 15 would be based on four analyses, which would be
similar in purpose to those performed during the Profile, Planning, and Implementation
phases, but would be implemented from scratch: Attach-Rate Analysis, Breakeven
Analysis, Strategic Analysis, and the Decision. Each of these analyses, described in the
following sections, represents an increasing amount of per-part work, so the parts list will
be filtered in four stages as it moves through the sequence. If any of the analyses
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indicates that a part is worth keeping, it will remain in the system until it is reviewed at
the next periodic interval.
4.2.2.1 Attach-Rate Analysis
The Attach-Rate Analysis begins with a list of every single SKLhnd gener ates a list of
peripherals with low sales volumes. All irrelevantSKUs , for example subassemblies and
software, are first removed from the list to generate the subset of peripherals. These
peripherals are then screened by attach rate, i.e. the percentage of shipped computers
using the peripheral, to arrive at a reduced list of peripherals for the Breakeven Analysis
of the next section. Any items with a sufficiently high attach rate would be automatically
retained until the next review period. The attach rate threshold would be adjusted over
time based on experience; 1% would be a useful starting point.
This analysis woulcbe performed by the Supply Chain Management (SCM)
organization, which is responsible for day-to-day materials procurement (see Section
2.1). There were three primary reasons for this selection, which was not contested by
anybody:
1. SCM purchases parts across all product lines, and would therefore have access to
the total consumption of a part, regardless of the products with which it is sold.
2. SCM already performs a more limited version of this analysis, so this would be a
natural extension of its existing work.
3. Early on, SCM management expressed a willingness to take on this work.
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4.2.2.2 Breakeven Analysis
The Attach-Rate Analysis of the previous section generates a list ofperipherals for the
Breakeven Analysis, which outputs a list of parts that appear to be unprofitable and
should therefore be considered for elimination. Unprofitable parts are those whose sales
volume appears to lidbelow the breakeven point, at which revenue (net of material cost
and the scaleable component of supply chain cost) does not exceed the non-scaleable (i.e.
fixed) component of supply chain cost. Because Dell policy dictates a 16% return on all
peripherals, breakeven in this case means a minimum return of 16%, not zero. As
described in Section 3.1, there is no perfect method to assign revenue and cost to part
numbers, primarily because revenue is earned on the SKUs at the top of the BOM tree
and cost is incurred at the part number level at the bottom of the BOM. The methodology
developed in Section 3.1, however, provides a reasonable approximation, and is applied
to all peripherals in the list to find those below the breakeven point. The limitations of
the Breakeven Analysis are acceptable because it wouldiot result in the automatic
elimination of parts. Instead, the results provide guidance to the decision, in which
strategic issues are considered and ultimately take precedence. Profitable parts are
retained until the next periodic review cycle, while unprofitable parts are transferred to
the Strategic Analysis.
There was some disagreement about which of two organizations should perform the
Breakeven Analysis: the CoC or Product Group (PG) Finance. While there were valid
reasons for assigning the task to either, with a reasonable chance of a successful
implementation, PG Finance is, on balance, the appropriate organization. The primary
reason is that the finance organization's approval affords the financial decision a degree
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of legitimacy, enhanced by the perception of impartiality, that the CoC would not be able
to match. Although the financial results are only meant to provide guidance, this
credibility is essential in order to avoid endless arguments about the suitability of the
assumptions in the cost model and the part-profitability calculations.
4.2.2.3 Strategic Analysis
The list of parts that were found to be unprofitable under the Breakeven Analysisis then
sent to the Peripheral Core Team for the Strategic Analysis. Any relevant issues that
were not considered in the financial analysis are evaluated at this stage. This is an
opportunity to consider any broader strategic or marketing concerns, which are by their
nature subjective and can therefore not be easily described by a monetary figure. The
following examples illustrate the types of issues that might be considered in this analysis:
1. Commitments to existing customers to provide a specific part as a general
condition for wider, more profitable business.
2. The ability to advertise low-priced systems, which attract potential customers who
can then be convinced to upgrade to more lucrative products.
3. Defensive presence in a market space in order to deprive competitors of a
potential profit pool.
While it woulhot perform all of the detailed analysis, the Peripheral Core Team would
be responsible for assigning responsibility to the correct representative. This is necessary
because further data gathering or analysis may have to be performed by different
organizations. For example, Marketing may evaluate current offerings in the peripheral's
market space, or the CoC may review pricing strategies. After performing the assigned
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analysis, the responsible team member wouk resent the result s to the Peripheral Core
Team for the Decision, which is addressed in the following section.
4.2.2.4 Decision
The Peripheral Core Team would then use the results from the Breakeven and Strategic
analyses for guidance in deciding whether a peripheral should be retained or sent to the
Service phase. Because the results of the Strategic Analysis will in many cases be
critical, but cannot be quantified, this decision will be subjective, and will take place at
the team's regularly scheduled meetings. The decision must be taken by a Core Team, as
it is the only forum in which all organizations with an interest in the decision are
represented. The Peripheral Core Team was selected instead of the Sustaining Core
Team because it has visibility across all platforms that use a peripheral. It may in fact
consult with the Sustaining Core Teams for products that would be affected by the
decision to eliminate a part, but it wouldiltimately be responsible for the decision.
4.2.3 Service Phase
Finally, any parts that the Peripheral Core Team decides should be eliminated woulbe
sent into the Service Phase. The main activity during this phase, which takes place after
the product's end of production life, is to support the warranties on any systems left in the
field. Operations within the Service Phase would not be affected by this proposal; the
only difference is that a larger set of parts would be passed on from the Management
Phase.
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4.3 SUMMARY
The third and final phase of the project was the development of a set of management
procedures to systematically review all peripherals and remove those that are unprofitable
or unnecessary. These procedures are to be integrated into Dell's existing Phase Review
Process (PRP), which relies on Core Teams that include representatives from all
organizations that have a stake in a product. The PRP already includes reasonably robust
procedures for determining whether a new peripheral should be introduced; these would
be supplemented bythe supply chain modeldescribed irSection 2. A new set of
procedures would also be put in place to periodically review all parts, progressively
passing them through an Attach-Rate Analysis, a Breakeven Analysis that uses the
methodologies developed in Section 3, and finally a Strategic Analysis. The appropriate
Peripheral Core Team would then make the decision to retain the part or remove it from
the product lineup.
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5 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The ability to customize products to each customer's unique requirements can be a source
of competitive advantage, as it has been for Dell. It is important, however, to effectively
manage the catalog of customer options in order to minimize the costs of maintaining the
underlying parts. When addressing the part-proliferation problem in other settings, one
should first consider the two alternative approaches described in Section 1.3.1: the
comprehensive, top-down review of the product offering recommended by Child et al.,
and the optimization of the management of allparts, rather than the elimination of a
subset of parts. Given the constraints of Dell's business environment and the current
state of its supply chain, these approaches were found to be suboptimal, leading to the
approach proposed here.
The first - and most important - step is to quantify the cost to the entire supply chain of
managing a single part. Without this information, there is no way to determine whether
the benefits, both tangible and intangible, of adding or retaining a part outweigh the costs,
and the only argument against offering the part becomes a subjective, indefensible
position that "complexity is bad." Because it is impossible to precisely determine that
cost at any instant, especially in a rapidly changing environment like Dell's, any model
has to be an approximation that relies on a series of assumptions. The balance between
model accuracy and simplicity is not an easy one to strike;here , the Pareto Principle is
used to find the subset of cost drivers that account for 80% of the total cost. Given the
broad bands of uncertainty in the cost estimates, and the fact that the supply chain cost is
only one input to an ultimately qualitative decision, this provided an adequate level of
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accuracy. It is important to keep in mind, though, that it may be necessary in some
settings to establish a more accurate model in order to overcome political obstacles, as it
is all too easy for opponents to use objections to the model's assumptions as a pretext for
general opposition to a part-reduction effort. To overcome these problems once the
appropriate level of accuracy has been selected, it is vital to afford the model legitimacy
by obtaining high-level management approval. This cost model can be worth developing
even if the objective is not a reduction in the number of parts, as the visibility into the
cost structure that it provides would be valuable in other types of decisions. An
important enhancement to the model would be the establishment of several broad
categories of parts, doing away with the assumption that all types of parts incur the same
costs (see Section 2.3).
Once the cost of part management has been determined, a sample of real parts should be
evaluated. This helps to establish methodologies for selecting parts for elimination,
solving problems like the allocation of cost and revenue. This process also provides an
idea of the amount of work thatwill be required to collect data about individual parts. In
the case of Dell, the integration of information systems is likely to be the greatest
obstacle to the implementation of these recommendations (see Section 3.1.2). This case
study is also important because it quantifies the potential savings, justifying the possibly
disruptive implementation of a process to remove unnecessary parts.
Finally, the results of the cost model and case study are integrated into a set of
management procedures. Because the decision about any part will always be partly
subjective, as it requires consideration of unquantifiable inputs such as marketing or
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strategic issues, this process should establish a setting in which all concerned parties can
discuss the issues and reach a consensus. These meetings should be integrated into
existing processes, such as Dell's Phase Review Process. Otherwise, the review of parts
is likely to be neglected as more immediate problems are addressed, and the significant
time required for the process is never set aside.
While some constituencies will always argue for more parts, and others for fewer, this
process will ensure that the product lineup is defined not by chance or by the
constituencies' political influence, but by an objective, systematic set of criteria. This
results not only in direct savings through the elimination of parts, but also in the
preemption of wasteful, ad hoc efforts to reduce the costs of part management.
85
REFERENCES
Child, Peter, Raimund Diederichs, Falk-Hayo Sanders, and Stefan Wisniowski. "SMR
Forum: The Management of Complexity." MIT Sloan Management Review, Fall 1991,
73-80.
Lampel, Joseph and Henry Mintzberg. "Customizing Customization." MIT Sloan
Management Review, Fall 1996, 21-30.
Nahmias, Steven. Production and Operations Analysis. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-
Hill/Irwin, 2001.
Rockwell, Clinton J. "A Framework for Optimizing the Supply Chain: A Case Study at
Kodak." LFM Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002.
Simchi-Levi, David, Philip Kaminsky, and Edith Simchi-Levi. Designing & Managing
the Supply Chain: Concepts, Strategies & Case Studies. 2 "d ed. New York: McGraw-
Hill, 2003.
Teunter, Ruud and Erwin van der Laan. "On the Non-Optimality of the Average Cost
Approach for Inventory Models with Remanufacturing." International Journal of
Production Economics, September 1, 2002, 67-73.
Womack, James P. and Daniel T. Jones. Lean Thinking: Banish Waste and Create
Wealth in Your Corporation. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
Zipkin, Paul. "The Limits of Mass Customization." MIT Sloan Management Review,
Spring 2001, 81-87.
86
